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One popular strategy of opposition to practices of female genital 
cutting (FCG) is rooted in the global feminist movement. Arguing that 
women’s rights are human rights, global feminists contend that practices of 
FGC are a culturally specific manifestation of gender-based oppression that 
violates a number of rights. Many African feminists resist a women’s rights 
approach. They argue that by focusing on gender as the primary axis of 
oppression affecting the African communities where FGC occurs, a women’s 
rights approach has misrepresented African women as passive victims who 
need to be rescued from African men and has obscured the role of certain 
international institutions that have perpetuated the oppression of African 
women. In this paper, I defend these critiques by arguing that the use of a 
women’s rights framework to combat practices of female genital cutting 
among African communities has often been practically ineffective and morally 
inappropriate.  
 
Introduction  
One of the most popular strategies of opposition to practices of 
female genital cutting (FGC) is rooted in the global feminist 
movement, which construes patriarchy as the root cause of women’s 
oppression around the globe. Arguing that women’s rights are human 
rights, global feminists contend that practices of FGC are a culturally 
specific manifestation of patriarchy or gender-based oppression that 
violates a number of rights including the rights of the child, the right to 
bodily and sexual integrity, and the right to freedom from torture and 
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violence. Many African feminists have been highly critical of the global 
feminist discourse on FGC for its tendency to characterize these 
practices as a “symptom of female victimization by male authority and 
an attempt to control women’s sexuality” (Abursharaf 2006). They 
charge that, by focusing on gender as the primary or sole axis of 
oppression affecting the African communities where FGC occurs, global 
feminists have (mis) represented African women as passive helpless 
victims who need to be rescued from African men in positions of power 
who are trying to control them. Moreover, some African feminists 
argue that a human rights approach fails to identify accurately the 
nature of the moral violations FGC inflicts and obscures the role of 
certain state actors and international institutions both historically and 
at present that have been involved in perpetuating these practices.  
I agree that the way human rights have been constructed and 
used to combat practices of FGC and other gender-specific wrongs 
within African communities has often been practically ineffective and 
morally inappropriate. In the first part of this paper, I discuss these 
critiques in a bit more detail and then illustrate their force by 
examining practices of FGC among the Maasai of Kenya and Tanzania. 
I then conclude with some very general suggestions for how we might 
reconsider the relationship between gender and rights in order to 
facilitate a more practically effective and morally appropriate use of 
human rights to combat the oppression women around the globe.  
 
Women’s Rights as Human Rights  
It is now widely recognized that early rights documents, such as 
the United Nation’s Universal Declaration of Human Rights, failed to 
provide adequate protection for women. The concept of rights 
employed in such documents came out of an enlightenment 
understanding of rights that rested on a fairly rigid public/private 
distinction (Okin 1998). On this model, the scope of rights protected 
against abuses within the public realm, the realm of work and 
citizenship, and protected from external interference in the private 
realm of family, religion, and culture. The problem of course is that a 
vast majority of women around the world spend a vast majority of 
their lives and experience some of the worst forms of abuse within the 
so-called private realm. By defining the family, religion, and culture 
outside of the scope of rights, early human rights documents made 
many of the most egregious violations against women at best invisible 
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and at worst justifiable by appeals to respect for cultural and religious 
differences.1  
In the decades following, the Committee on the Elimination of 
Discrimination Against Women, a global feminist movement, emerged 
that began theorizing rights from the lives of women, culminating in 
the 1995 Beijing Declaration and Platform for Action and continuing 
today (Covenant for the Millennium 1996; Morgan 1984; Peters and 
Wolper 1995; Bunch 1999; Okin 1999). The Beijing platform 
articulated a new conception of rights that brought previously 
protected realms of family, religion, and culture under scrutiny and 
named specific practices, such as FGC, as human rights abuses. No 
doubt the Beijing Platform and other international efforts have made 
important strides in making the rights of women visible and in forcing 
the international community to challenge those who hide behind 
respect for cultural and religious differences in order to justify abuse of 
and discrimination against women. Nonetheless, the global feminist 
movement to make women’s rights human rights has prompted heated 
and at times bitter debate. One pocket of continued resistance comes 
from African scholars and activists working to address practices of FGC 
occurring within African communities (Abusharaf 2006; Nnaemeka 
2005). These women condemn FGC and seek eradication efforts. They 
do not dispute the moral status of these practices but rather the global 
feminist discourse surrounding these practices. As Obioma Nnaemeka 
states:  
 
Female circumcision has been condemned as a “torture” or 
“degrading treatment” that lacks any “respect for the dignity” of 
women and girls. And it should be. Unfortunately, some of the 
most egregious manifestations of “degrading treatment” and 
lack of “respect for dignity” lie in the modus operandi of many 
Westerners (feminists and others) who have intervened in this 
matter. The resistance of African women is not against the 
campaign to end the practice, but against their dehumanization 
and the lack of dignity and respect shown to them in the 
process. (Nnaemeka 2005, p. 30; Hale 2005; Korieh 2005)  
 
The core of their critique is that the global feminist movement, 
instrumental in redefining and promoting women’s human rights, has 
really been a Western rather than a global project. The charge is that 
the global feminist movement to re-conceptualize women’s rights from 
the lives of women, did so from the lives of particular women, namely 
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those living in communities of the global North such as the USA and 
Western Europe. The concept of women’s rights as articulated in 
documents like the Beijing Platform reflect a particular understanding 
of gender and gender-based oppression, as these are manifested in 
Western liberal democracies. Specifically, the concept of women’s 
rights presupposes gender dualism, that there are only two genders 
(i.e., man and woman) and that the root cause of women’s oppression 
is patriarchy, a situation in which men dominate women socially, 
politically, and economically. These particular interpretations of gender 
and gender-based oppression coupled with the tendency to focus on 
gender as the sole or primary axis of oppression for women around the 
world provides a moral lens that fails to capture accurately the nature 
of the moral violations and abuses many women suffer and thereby 
fails to recommend morally appropriate solutions.  
Discussions that took place at Beijing were not blind to these 
concerns and recognized the difficulties in creating and using human 
rights as a monolithic instrument for addressing gender-specific 
wrongs because of the difficulty in treating women as a homogenous 
group or unified category. Nonetheless women’s human rights were 
included in the final draft of the Declaration, and the Platform for 
Action identified central areas of concern (Guerrina and Zalewski 
2007). I turn now to illustrate the problem more precisely by 
considering the failure of a women’s rights-based approach, as it has 
typically been employed, to produce an adequate moral evaluation of 
practices of FGC among a particular group of people: the Maasai of 
Kenya and Tanzania.  
 
Moral Analysis of FGC Among the Maasai  
According to the 1959 UN Convention on the Rights of the Child, 
each child has a right to “develop physically, mentally, morally, 
spiritually, and socially in a healthy and normal manner and in 
conditions of freedom and dignity” (United Nations 1959). Those who 
advocate a rights-based approach argue that FGC violates a child’s 
right to normal and healthy development in conditions of freedom and 
dignity because these practices are medically unnecessary, usually 
extremely painful, disrupt the normal physical and sexual development 
of the child, and are often performed under coercive conditions in 
which a child does not have the opportunity to voice opposition to FGC 
and is not old or mature enough to really understand the procedure 
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and its potential consequences. The Beijing Platform reaffirms the 
rights of the child but goes further by focusing explicitly on the rights 
of the girl child and by identifying FGC as an act of violence against 
women and girls that constitutes a violation of their rights. The Beijing 
Platform defines violence against women as “any form of gender-based 
violence that results in or is likely to result in physical, sexual, or 
psychological harm.”2 Moreover, it states, “Violence against women is 
a manifestation of the historically unequal power relations between 
men and women, which have led to domination over and 
discrimination against women by men and to the prevention of 
women’s full advancement.” It locates the source of gender-based 
violence as deriving “essentially from cultural patterns, in particular 
the harmful effects of certain traditional or customary practices.”3 
Thus, when viewed through the moral lens provided by the Beijing 
Platform, FGC appears and indeed is labeled as a culturally specific 
manifestation of patriarchy, an act of violence against women rooted 
in cultural customs and traditions that aim to preserve male 
dominance and female subordination.  
Because culture and religion are so often used to justify the 
oppression of women, the triumph of Beijing was to secure a set of 
gender-specific rights to combat gender-specific wrongs wherever they 
may be occurring and despite whatever cultural or religious 
justification might be offered in their defense. One danger, however, is 
that these rights’ standards becomes fixed or static moral starting 
points for a kind of top-down approach to moral reasoning in the 
global arena. We start with a particular set of rights, which presuppose 
that “violence against women is a manifestation of the historically 
unequal power relations between men and women” that derive 
“essentially from cultural patterns,” and then apply these across a 
wide variety of contexts in order to identify morally egregious practices 
that perpetuate this kind of violence. This model of reasoning 
discourages the idea that a thoroughly historical and cultural analysis 
of FGC is relevant to a moral analysis of FGC. Instead, we start out 
“knowing” that these practices constitute human rights violations and 
even “knowing” their root cause—patriarchy. Contextual details may 
be invoked at the level of implementation, but they are not typically 
viewed as relevant to the moral analysis. Yet, the cultural and 
historical information a top-down approach belies may in fact be vital 
for an accurate moral evaluation of the practices under scrutiny. In 
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order to see, this, I want to offer a culturally and historically laden 
analysis of FGC as practiced among the Maasai. This analysis of Maasai 
gender relations reveals that FGC is in fact not best understood as 
primarily gender-based violence that derives essentially from Maasai 
cultural patterns. Rather, the link between FGC and the oppression of 
Maasai women is the product of complex historical interactions 
between already existing Maasai social relations and a distinctively 
Western patriarchal ideology imposed on Maasai social life through 
formal colonization.  
The Maasai are primarily pastoralists who make their living by 
raising and herding cattle. They live on homesteads, practice 
polygamy, and circumcise both boys and girls at around the same age. 
Age and gender are the two primary axes of social organization among 
the Maasai and determine the distribution of roles, rights, and 
responsibilities in Maasai culture. Anthropologist Dorothy Hodgson 
notes that, historically, Maasai gender relations were neither dualistic 
nor hierarchical but were based on notions of complementarity and 
interdependence. While it is possible to distinguish between a domestic 
sphere of home and homestead and a public space outside the 
homestead, these areas were not gendered as primarily female and 
male. Instead both men and women occupied sections of domestic and 
public space (Hodgson 1999, 2001). Hodgson likens Maasai social 
organization to spikes in a bicycle wheel, in which each “category of 
person, whether young boys or old women, was required to fulfill its 
responsibilities for livestock and for each other to ensure survival and 
progress of Maasai households, homesteads, and communities” 
(Hodgson 1999, p. 50).  
For girls, the Maasai practice what the WHO calls type II 
circumcision or excision, which includes the removal of the clitoris and 
the labia minora. A girl’s circumcision is arranged by her parents 
usually just after her first menstruation when it is determined that she 
is ready for marriage and the responsibilities associated with 
womanhood. The practitioners are elder women, and the ritual 
involves exclusively women and includes weeks of preparation as girls 
spend time with their mothers and other elder women learning about 
the rights and responsibilities that attach to Maasai womanhood. The 
Maasai believe that circumcision plays an important role in the sexual 
maturity of a girl by marking the final stage in a gradual process 
through which a girl becomes a woman. While a “girl” is sexually 
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immature (i.e., literally not yet fertile) and socially unprepared to bear 
and raise children, a “woman” is fertile, ready for and open to 
reproduction, and socially equipped to assume the privileges and 
responsibilities that attach to Maasai womanhood. The Maasai believe 
that circumcision protects and promotes a woman’s fertility and marks 
the actualization of her biological capacity to reproduce. Yet, 
importantly, it also indicates a certain level of social responsibility. In 
an interview with anthropologist Barbara Hoffman, Alice, a Maasai 
woman, explains that even if a girl has had ten kids, if she has not 
been circumcised, she will still be considered a child (Hoffman 2002, 
film).  
In the period prior to formal colonization, the social 
responsibilities associated with Maasai womanhood included a 
significant amount of economic and political power. Though each 
homestead belongs to an elder man, each house within a homestead 
belongs to the woman who built it (Aud Talle 1998, xx, p. 133). Each 
wife erects her own house according to the order in which she was 
married, and she controls access to her house, including the access of 
her husband. As anthropologist Aud Talle notes, occupancy and 
ownership of a house is a “sign of female maturity and is the base 
from which female agency is most successfully exercised” (Aud Talle 
1998, xx, p. 133). In a very literal sense, ownership of a house gives a 
woman authority to act. For example, though male elders were the 
primary arbiters of community and clan disputes, a married Maasai 
woman, well established in her home, enjoyed a fair amount of 
political power, as she was able to initiate and testify at judicial 
proceedings and often conferred with her husband in resolving 
disputes both within and between homesteads (Hodgson 1999, p. 48).  
As pastoralists, the care and management of livestock is 
absolutely crucial to community survival, and so perhaps the most 
significant of all the rights associated with Maasai womanhood were 
economic rights. While elder men made broad managements decisions 
about the timing and location of grazing and watering herds and 
ilmurran (i.e., the young male warrior class) were responsible for 
guarding the herd from animal attacks or thieves, married women had 
primary responsibility over livestock products. Once well established in 
her house, a Maasai woman controlled the production and distribution 
of milk, which is the primary food staple for the Maasai and plays a 
crucial role in the ritual life of the community. A Maasai woman milked 
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her cattle twice a day, kept the milk in gourds to which she alone had 
access, and then determined the distribution of milk among herself, 
her children, her husband, visitors, strangers, and even enemies when 
milk was used to establish a peace agreement. Moreover, Maasai 
women were also the primary traders in the community traveling to 
markets outside the homestead in order to barter surplus milk and 
hides in exchange for other important goods. Husbands and wives also 
shared overlapping cattle rights deciding together whether to 
slaughter, trade, or give away an animal (Hodgson 1999, p. 48).  
However, only a married woman could own a house and assume 
the responsibilities and privileges that attach to milk and cattle rights, 
and only the circumcised are considered women and marriageable. 
Thus, cultural logic dictated the importance of circumcision in a 
woman’s ability to become a fully participating and relatively powerful 
member of her community. Despite the rigidly defined social roles for 
both males and females, however, social relations between the sexes 
were premised not on domination and subordination but on mutual 
respect and relative autonomy within those roles. Indeed, Hodgson 
concludes that “‘patriarchal’ may be a deeply problematic term by 
which to characterize Maasai gender relations during this period. 
Although men, especially elder men, served as primary leaders and 
arbitrators for their communities, the responsibilities and interactions 
of men and women were complementary and interdependent” 
(Hodgson 1999, p. 50).  
Gender relations among the Maasai shifted dramatically, 
however, during and after formal colonization by the British (c. 1920–
1961). The British brought with them assumptions about gendered 
division of labor in which men were dominant in the public realm of 
work and political decision making and women were primarily 
responsible for child rearing and other domestic chores. As Hodgson 
notes, British authorities “mapped their gender ideologies on to their 
understandings of and interventions in Maasai life,” creating “the male 
domains of public and political in opposition and superior to the female 
domains of private and domestic” (Hodgson 1999, p. 57). The colonial 
policies infused with this ideology, while devastating for all Maasai, 
were particularly catastrophic for Maasai women. The three most 
significant colonial policies that altered gender relations among the 
Maasai were (1) the implementation of indirect rule, (2) the 
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transformation of a barter economy into a cash economy, and (3) the 
imposition of a new tax system.  
The policy of indirect rule aimed at identifying a central 
authority to represent the Maasai and to act as an intermediary 
between the Maasai and British authorities. Assuming that male elders 
were already “the” political leaders, these policies reshaped Maasai 
political life by extending the authority of select male elders over both 
junior men and women, strengthening and consolidating their power. 
Thus, rather than having political authority somewhat dispersed and at 
least somewhat shared among Maasai men and women, indirect rule 
created a centralized male authority and women lost whatever political 
power they may have previously enjoyed (Hodgson 1999, pp. 53–55). 
Needing to create a cash economy in order to produce tax revenue for 
the crown, the British also transformed a previously female-based 
barter economy into a newly male-dominated cash economy. Livestock 
was now to be bought and sold on the market for cash. Assuming that 
males were the “owners” of cattle, Maasai men were integrated into 
the new economy as buyers and sellers of livestock, while Maasai 
women were dispossessed from their previously shared cattle rights. 
Furthermore, women “could generally only gain access to cash 
indirectly through gifts from men or the sale of cattle by their sons or 
husbands” and thus went from being primary agents in the Maasai 
economy to economically dependent on male elders (Hodgson 1999, p. 
57). The third policy, which followed directly from the second, was to 
implement a new system of taxation. This system designated male 
elders as “tax payers” and “heads of household,” who were now 
required to pay a hut tax or “plural wives” tax for “dependent” women 
living on their homestead (Hodgson 1999, p. 58). The combined effect 
of these policies over time was severe material disenfranchisement, 
political and economic disempowerment, and conceptual devaluation of 
women. Women went from enjoying at least some political and 
economic authority and autonomy to being completely dependent on 
men and, through the system of taxation, to being viewed as property 
rather than persons (Hodgson 1999, pp. 64–65).  
Historically, FGC was linked to significant economic, political, 
and ritual power for women. Today, the link between FGC and the 
economic and political roles of Maasai women remains, but the shift in 
gender relations during formal colonization transformed these into 
roles of economic and political dependence. This historically and 
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contextually rich analysis reveals that FGC among the Maasai is not 
best understood as a violent manifestation of the historically unequal 
power relations between Maasai men and women rooted in Maasai 
cultural patterns that are inherently patriarchal. Rather, the link 
between FGC and the political and economic disempowerment of 
Maasai women is in large part the result of historically unequal power 
relations between all the Maasai and their British colonizers. I do not 
intend to romanticize or idealize Maasai social relations prior to 
colonization. Indeed, Hodgson notes that opportunistic Maasai men 
took advantage of colonial policies in order to strengthen their political 
and economic power over other men and over women. Rather, the 
resultant shift in Maasai gender relations and the link between FGC 
and the oppression of Maasai women is the product of complex 
interactions between existing Maasai social relations and colonial rule. 
It is this complexity that document like the Beijing Platform miss and 
that I contend is crucial for an adequate moral analysis of FGC.  
 
Concluding Thoughts  
I do not mean either to defend practices of FGC or to deny the 
importance of human rights as tools for moral assessment and political 
action. Rather, my aim in this paper is to illustrate a fairly significant 
limitation in the way women’s human rights have been constructed 
and are often used to combat practices of FGC and other gender-
specific wrongs. Gender is not static or fixed and does not have a 
single referent but instead is one axis of social organization that 
intersects with many others to generate complex systems of 
oppression for differently situated women. This phenomenon of 
intersectional oppression is often paid lip service but is not often 
reflected in processes of moral reasoning and moral discourse that 
produce what “we” know about FGC or other gender-specific wrongs. If 
we start our moral analysis with a rights standard that assumes a 
particular interpretation of gender and gender-based oppression, and 
then apply this standard to identify and combat gender-specific wrongs 
in contexts where gender relations do not fit our initial assumptions, 
then we risk misidentifying the nature of the moral violations under 
scrutiny and risk implementing ineffective eradication strategies. A 
more accurate moral analysis of the violence against Maasai women 
that FGC is said to inflict must include the violence of the historical 
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experience of colonization, for it was a kind of violence, and how this 
experience contributed to the oppression of Maasai women.  
At this point, one might wonder, however, that if the end result 
is not in dispute, namely that FGC is morally wrong and ought to be 
stopped, then why does it matter that our moral analysis be 
contextually and historically sensitive? Or, since colonial policies 
imposed a distinctively Western patriarchal ideology that did alter 
gender relations and that now appears to be the root cause of 
women’s oppression around the globe, then why do we need a 
culturally and historically rich analysis of FGC in order to secure an 
adequate moral analysis of these practices as they are currently 
practiced? There are several shortcomings to moral reasoning that 
targets FGC in abstraction from the particular cultural and historical 
contexts of the Maasai: A contextually and historically deficient moral 
analysis of FGC (1) obscures the complexity of Maasai gender relations 
(e.g., that there are more than two) and, in particular, the ways in 
which Western notions of gender intersected with Maasai 
understandings of gender to render the particular forms of oppression 
Maasai women experience; (2) in so doing, it obscures the significant 
contribution of international forces, such as colonization, in the 
oppression of Maasai women; (3) such an analysis risks perpetuating 
negative stereotypes about African men and women; (4) it risks 
reinforcing harmful global power dynamics, whereby members of more 
powerful nations such as the USA and those of Western Europe 
dominate economically, politically, and militarily also wield epistemic 
power in international moral discourse; (5) finally, this kind of analysis 
risks informing ineffective or harmful eradication efforts.  
It is these kinds of concerns that Obioma Nnaemeka raises 
when she claims, “some of the most egregious manifestations of 
‘degrading treatment’ and lack of ‘respect for dignity’ lie in the modus 
operandi of many Westerners” who have intervened in discourse 
surrounding FGC (Nnaemeka 2005, p. 30; Hale 2005; Korieh 2005). 
The scholars and activists who resist the global feminist discourse 
surrounding women’s human rights are not simply rehashing the 
universalism/relativism debate. Rather, they are issuing an urgent call 
for more responsible moral knowledge production at the global level. A 
more accurate moral analysis of the violence against Maasai women 
that FGC is said to inflict must include the violence of the historical 
experience of colonization and how this experience intersects with and 
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transforms existing gender relations contributing to the oppression of 
Maasai women.  
Political theorist Moira Gatens suggests that we should not 
conceive of human rights as a “rigid atemporal ‘law’, nor should 
cultural norms be seen as incontestable” (Gatens 2004). The global 
feminist movement has worked hard to ensure the latter, that local 
cultural and religious norms are not incontestable; yet this approach 
often fails to acknowledge the former, that human rights need not 
(and I would say should not) be conceived as atemporal, rigid moral 
norms. The movement to make women’s rights human rights has been 
the result of moral deliberation among some of the most powerful 
members of the global community. This does not make them irrelevant 
to addressing gender-specific wrongs affecting less powerful members 
of the global order. I think it does mean that rights ought to function 
as flexible conceptual tools in contextually and historically rich 
practices of moral reasoning aimed at uncovering complex systems of 
oppression. Moreover, I think it sets those of us working on moral 
reasoning in a global context a task of determining how to establish 
practices of moral reasoning that are more inclusive and that generate 
more genuinely universal standards for moral assessment. It is 
strategically important to retain some notion of women’s rights, but it 
is equally important to retain a critical awareness of how women’s 
rights are constructed, who is involved (or not involved in constructing 
them) and how they are used (or misused) in combating gender-
specific wrongs.  
 
Notes  
1. For example, Susan Okin notes that, while slavery is now widely recognized 
as a human rights violation, the practice of bride selling has rarely 
been viewed as an instance of slavery. Rather, “if a husband pays a 
bride price for his wife, or marries her without her adult consent; if he 
confines her to their home, forbids her to work for pay, or appropriates 
her wages; if he beats her for disobedience or mishap; these 
manifestations of slavery would not be recognized as violations of 
human rights in many parts of the world,” but as culturally appropriate 
behavior that is protected (p. 29).  
2. Beijing Platform, p. 59.  
3. Ibid, p. 60.  
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